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Congressional Delegation of Spending Power to
the Defense Department in the Post-9–11 Period
PHILIP J. CANDREVA and L. R. JONES
The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by
Congress have long been argued by defense leadership. It is an important issue
because of its relevance to congressional assessment of defense management,
budget priorities, and how to enforce policy preferences. This paper investigates
the series of supplemental appropriations for the war on terrorism to determine
(a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget
authority to defense, (b) what happened with respect to the degree of delegation
after appropriation during budget execution, and (c) what this case teaches us
about the evolving budgetary relationship between Congress and the Defense
Department.
The possibility of obtaining increased delegation of resource decision authority from
Congress has captivated defense budget officials and reformers since the late 1960s. Prior
to the 1960s, defense programs and budget appropriations were approved more easily
and in a far less controversial manner than the way the process has operated since
‘‘hawks’’ and ‘‘doves’’ began a protracted battle in the halls of Congress over the Viet-
nam War. Objections to the Vietnam War and the spending plans of President Lyndon
Johnson caused an increase in congressional authorization and appropriation detail and
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specificity, and greater budget execution oversight. More recently, Congress has delib-
erated over and voted for appropriations to pay for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many
of the same issues with respect to delegation of congressional budgetary authority and
control raised during the Vietnam War era have been debated anew since the United
States initiated military response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon in September 2001.
The degree of resource decision flexibility and delegation of authority from Congress
to the Department of Defense (DOD) has been examined by observers of congressional
defense budgeting and management for decades.1 Delegation of budget authority is an
important issue because it is highly relevant to (a) congressional assessment of defense
budget priorities and how best to enforce its policy preferences in DOD budgeting, (b)
analysis of proposals to reformulate defense programs and budget priorities, (c) how to
execute defense spending to greatest benefit, (d) selection of alternative appropriation
strategies within Congress, and (e) analysis of the effects of congressional control on
DOD budget execution and management practices.
The advantages of increased delegation of resource management authority by Con-
gress have long been asserted by DOD leadership. For example, DOD Comptroller
Robert Anthony developed an extensive plan for reorganizing defense accounting and
budgeting under Project Prime in the mid-1960s, but Congress rejected the proposal.2
Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci asked Congress for increased resource and managerial
powers at the end of the Reagan administration in 1988. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
proposed six acquisition programs in the 1991–1994 time frame for execution without
congressional oversight as a test of the DOD’s ability to operate efficiently independent
of external micromanagement. Despite considerable congressional lip service to the effect
that these proposals would increase program management and budget execution effi-
ciency and better ‘‘bang for the buck’’ in defense, Congress supported neither Carlucci’s
nor Cheney’s request.
Most recently, Defense Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld offered a set of legislative pro-
posals under the umbrella title, Defense Transformation for the 21st Century Act. In-
cluded among the proposals were requests for greater autonomy in budget execution.
Congress largely ignored the budgetary proposals and devoted most of their attention to
the more public proposal (creation of the National Security Personnel System). Given
1. See, for example, Norman Augustine, Augustine’s Laws (New York: American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics, 1982); A. Kanter, Defense Politics; J. R. Fox with J. L. Field, The Defense
Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988); J. S. Gansler,
Affording Defense (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); F. Thompson and L. R. Jones, Reinventing the
Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1994); and Jerry McCaffrey and L. R. Jones, Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense
(Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, 2004).
2. Lawrence R. Jones and Fred Thompson, Public Management: Institutional Renewal for the Twenty-
First Century (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999).
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this longstanding absence of trust of DOD management and budgetary judgment, it is
significant when Congress deviates from traditional patterns of control. This is why
examination of the case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) is worth-
while. In approving the DERF Congress appeared to be investing a significant degree of
trust in DOD management and budget execution capability.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the case study of the DERF to determine
(a) under what conditions, and how and why Congress delegates budget authority to the
Department of Defense (DOD), (b) what happened with respect to the degree of del-
egation initially provided in the DERF after appropriation during budget execution, and
(c) what this case teaches us about the constantly evolving budgetary relationship be-
tween Congress and the DOD.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE BUDGET EXECUTION AND
MANAGEMENT
Much has been written about congressional tendencies to ‘‘micromanage’’ the Defense
Department explaining the incentives, describing the costs and benefits of its effects,
debating whether it should occur, and documenting the manner in which it occurs. In this
section, that literature is quickly summarized to provide a foundation for understanding
Congress’ propensity for activism. Such a foundation is necessary for making sense of
why Congress delegated authority to the executive in the DERF appropriation then later
rescinded that authority.
The literature is fairly consistent in the analysis of why Congress tends to micro-
manage DOD, with respect to theoretical hypotheses on the variables that explain close
congressional oversight and absence of delegation. In summary, Congress has tradi-
tionally exercised control as constitutional prerogative,3 to shape defense policy,4 in
response to media publicity of defense mismanagement,5 and because of partisan con-
gressional-executive branch competition and occasional mistrust.6 As the defense budget
has historically accounted for at least half of all federal discretionary spending, it is
a favorite target for those legislators seeking to influence federal spending even for
3. Fox; Mackubin Thomas Owens, ‘‘Micromanaging the Defense Budget,’’ The Public Interest 100,
Summer (1990): 131–146; James M. Lindsay, ‘‘Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense:
Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom,’’ Armed Forces and Society 17, no. 1, Fall (1990): 7–33.
4. Lawrence R. Jones and Glenn C. Bixler, Mission Financing to Realign National Defense (Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press, 1992) and Kenneth R. Mayer, ‘‘Policy Disputes as a Source of Administrative Controls:
Congressional Micromanagement of the Department of Defense,’’ Public Administration Review 53, no. 4
(1993): 293–302.
5. Fox; Lindsay; and Jones and Bixler.
6. Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990); Mayer; and Thompson and Jones.
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nondefense matters.7 A final reason is the advocacy or protection of constituent interests,
e.g., military installations, labor, or defense contractors.8
It is not only important to examine why Congress tends to control defense, but it is
also useful to examine the manner in which that oversight occurs. The literature provides
us with a framework of tools including restrictions on the use of funding, tools for
gathering information, and accounting requirements. Regarding the use of funding, they
may make line item adjustments to the budget9; earmark funds for specific purposes10;
place restrictions on the reprogramming and transfer of funds between accounts11; and
restrict funds pending executive compliance with provisions of law or committee re-
ports.12 They gather information formally in congressional hearings and informally be-
tween congressional and DOD staff outside of hearings or through the use of reviews,
audits, and investigations by committee staff, General Accounting Office (GAO), and
CRS.13 Finally, Congress may place requirements on program execution or may specify
reports on myriad topics.14
Strong incentives are present for Congress to actively micromanage defense policy and
budgets, and congressional rules and procedures provide many means by which to con-
trol DOD through authorization, appropriation, and oversight. The case study of the
DERF, as explained in the sections of the paper that follows, illustrates how Congress
responded to this budgetary incentive structure from 2001 to 2003. The purpose in
investigating this case in detail is to determine more specifically under what circum-
stances Congress chooses to exercise more or less control over the DOD management
and budgeting.
RESPONSE TO CRISIS: A CASE STUDY
From September 2001 to October 2003, the DERF was used by Congress to delegate
budget authority to the DOD. DERF was an account designed to provide flexibility in
times of crisis, to provide obligation authority when a need arises, but before the specifics
7. Fox; Owens; Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, ‘‘Playing the Add-On Game in Congress:
The Increasing Importance of Constituent Interests and Budget Constraints in Determining Defense Pol-
icy,’’ in The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport, CT: Praeger Press,
1999), 85–106; and Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 4th
ed. (New York: Longman Press, 2001).
8. Lindsay; Blechman; Jones and Bixler; and W. D. Hartung, ‘‘The Shrinking Military Pork Barrel: The
Changing Distribution of Pentagon Spending, 1986–1996,’’ in The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense
Spending, ed. Leon V. Sigal (Westport: Praeger Press, 1999), 29–84.
9. Lindsay; Blechman; Mayer; Thompson and Jones; and Halperin and Lomasney.
10. Owens; Mayer.
11. Fox; Jones and Bixler; and Wildavsky and Caiden.
12. Owens.
13. Fox; Owens; Blechman; Lindsay; Jones and Bixler; Mayer; and Thompson and Jones.
14. Owens; Jones and Bixler.
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of the need are known. The global war on terrorism is just that sort of scenario: there
existed a need to conduct unconventional warfare, but because of the nature of the
operations, it was impossible to precisely predict how much funding was required in the
usual form of appropriations. Unknown were the specifics of how much for each service,
in which account, for reserves or active forces, to buy what, to be used when. Those
decisions, the administration argued, should be made by the Combatant Commander
based on military effectiveness and national security, not the constraints of a comptrol-
ler’s best guess. According to the administration, flexible authority was required and,
thus, was requested.
The ‘‘Emergency Response Fund, Defense’’ was initially created in the Fiscal Year
(FY) 1990 Department of Defense Appropriation Act (PL 101-65) and was provided
$100 million of obligation authority without FY limitation to its use. These funds were to
be used for reimbursement of other appropriations when used by the Defense Depart-
ment in support of state and local governments when responding to natural or manmade
disasters. Reimbursements would be deposited in the fund and would remain available
until expended. As originally conceived, DERF was not a mechanism for funding Def-
ense Department military activities overseas; instead it was designed to facilitate the use
of the department to address domestic problems (e.g., fighting forest fires).15
Military actions overseas were traditionally funded through existing operations ac-
counts if they were sufficient or through emergency supplemental appropriations.16
Given the increased frequency of contingency operations since the end of the Cold War,
in February 2001 the DOD updated the Financial Management Regulations to specif-
ically address the issue of funding contingency operations.17 It is DOD policy not to
budget for contingency operations, but rather to budget for a peacetime military. DOD
further ‘‘requires that controls, accounting systems, and procedures provide, in financial
records, proper identification and recording of costs incurred in supporting contingency
operations.’’18 Having autonomy in budget execution is useful when faced with emer-
gencies that were not part of the Department’s original budget. This became especially
true in the 1990s when the armed forces were used overseas six times more frequently
than during the Cold War.19 However, this policy document explicitly states that war-
time activities are not covered and represent an exception to Defense budgeting.
15. The DERF was so seldom and modestly used in the 1991–2001 period that comparative case
analyses would have been unfruitful.
16. Jerry McCaffrey and Paul Godek, ‘‘Defense Supplementals and the Budget Process,’’ Public Bud-
geting and Finance 23, no. 2, Summer (2003): 53–72.
17. Department of Defense, ‘‘Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation,’’ DOD
7000.4-R, Volume 12, Chapter 23 (January 2005); available from: http://www.DOD.mil/comptroller/fmr/:
accessed 8 July 2005.
18. Ibid., para 230104.
19. Richard F. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2001, Con-
gressional Research Service Report RL30172 (Washington, DC, February 2002).
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In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush
submitted to Congress a request for a FY 2001 supplemental appropriation of $20
billion. Costs associated with the immediate response and recovery efforts were properly
chargeable to the FY 2001 appropriations, yet those funds were nearly depleted as there
were less than three weeks remaining in the FY. One week later, Congress appropriated
$40 billion in a transfer account in Public Law 107-38, Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States. While the funds had intentionally few restrictions ex ante, there were ex post
requirements placed on the executive branch. For example, $10 billion was provided
immediately, $10 billion more was available within 15 days of notification by OMB to
Congress of the planned use of the funds, and the remaining $20 billion was available
only after subsequent request and enactment, and the bill required periodic reporting of
transfers and outlays.
Between September 21 and November 30, 2001, the president provided Congress
details on the use of the first $20 billion and on October 17, 2001, requested the re-
maining $20 billion. The Defense Department portion of the first $20 billion totaled
$13.74 billion and of the second increment, $7.4 billion. During this time, OMB issued
Bulletin 02-01 which provided reporting requirements to the heads of agencies. OMB
promised Congress quarterly reports, on the condition that OMB obtained monthly
information from the executive agencies. The reports required data on obligations and
outlays in 10 broad spending categories. Of note is that these 10 categories do not
correspond with either the DOD’s 11 major force programs or the structure of its regular
appropriations. These distinctions proved problematic when accounting for the DERF.
A view of the first DOD report is provided in Table 1.
How can we explain Congressional actions? The political atmosphere the week after
the terrorist attacks was one of self-preservation through unity. Bipartisan and intra-
governmental politics are viewed as petty during a crisis. There was a clear understanding
that recovery and response would be expensive and that providing funding was one of
the few tangible acts Congress could take. Referring to Congress, Stephen J. Wayne of
Georgetown University was quoted in Congressional Quarterly, ‘‘Their role at the mo-
ment is to cheer [the president] on, to show unity and give him what he wants.’’20 The
administration requested $20 billion without restrictions and Congress was nearly willing
to provide it, when a few members raised concerns, most notably Rep. David R. Obey
(D-WI), ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee. ‘‘The problem is,
when you give any White House $20 billion with not a single string attached . . . you have
abdicated Congress’ responsibility,’’ said Obey.21 The ensuing compromise was the
$40 billion appropriation described above. The incentives for Congress were to appear
20. John Cochran and Mike Christensen, ‘‘Regrouping with a Common Purpose,’’ Congressional
Quarterly Weekly, 15 September 2001, 2114.
21. Mary Dalrymple, ‘‘Obey Sounds a Solitary Warning against Carte Blanche,’’ Congressional Quar-
terly Weekly, 15 September 2001, 2131.
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unified and to support the nation through the appropriation of funds as expeditiously as
possible. Doing so without unduly eroding their constitutional authority over the power
of the purse was almost an afterthought.
The September 2001 emergency supplemental appropriation (PL 107-38) placed the
entire sum in an emergency response fund at the Executive Office of the President. The
act provided the president authority to transfer funds ‘‘to any authorized Federal Gov-
ernment activity’’ and a portion of the funds became DERF when transferred to the
DOD. This was a logical account in which to place the fundsFit already existed and was
created for disaster response. Per the design of DERF and the language of the supple-
mental appropriation, the funds could be used by the Defense Department for any type
of expenditure in response to and recovery from the terrorist attacks. The funds could
not, however, be easily transferred to other DOD appropriations. Subsequent transfer
authority was not provided with the supplemental appropriation. Many defense activities
spent considerable sums from other appropriation titles, such as Operations and Main-
tenance, on recovery and response tasks. While these obligations were necessary to meet
urgent requirements, without specific transfer authority, they may have been in violation
of the fiscal law that prohibits using funds ‘‘otherwise provided for’’ and the improper
augmentation of one appropriation with funds from another. The Defense Department
sought legislative approval to transfer obligation authority from DERF to these other
appropriations to reimburse those expenses that would be more appropriately paid with
DERF.
TABLE1
Example of Office of Management and Budget/Emergency Response Fund Expenditure
Report
Report on Expenditures from the Emergency Response Fund Amounts as of November 30, 2001
(In Thousands of Dollars)
Department of Defense Budget Authority Obligations
Increased situational awareness $4,056.9 $1,302.7
Enhanced force protection 1,509.0 361.4
Improved command and control 1,273.0 163.7
Increased worldwide posture 3,542.3 651.9
Offensive counterterrorism 1,490.0 76.4
Procurement 0.0 0.0
Initial crisis response 606.0 153.1
Pentagon repair/upgrade 530.0 480.0
Other 100.0 100.0
Airport security 228.0 19.1
Total $13,335.2 $3,308.4
Source: Office of Management and Budget, ‘‘Quarterly Report to Congress on the Use of the Emergency Response
Fund,’’ 23 January 2002.
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Such transfer authority was provided in December 2001 when the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 was enacted (PL 107-107). Among the provisions
of the Act, Sections 1502 and 1503 authorized DERF for FYs 2001 and 2002, respec-
tively, in the exact amounts already transferred (or requested) by the administration,
validating the administration’s judgment in the allocation of these funds. Section 1506
further codified the reporting mandated in the supplemental appropriations bill. While
this was authorizing, not appropriating legislation, the transfer authority was granted
and allowed the department significant latitude by giving lower echelon commands the
ability to spend available dollars with the expectation of being reimbursed by DERF. It
is also significant in that Congress affirmed the administration’s discretion on the use of
the original $40 billion.
DERF was considered a blessing at the lower-level commands. The deputy comp-
troller for the Navy Special Warfare Command said, ‘‘The primary advantage of DERF
for field operators was its lack of appropriation restrictions such as funds expiration and
investment threshold. There was no obligation rate or year-end pressure so funds could
be planned more effectively. There were no procurement [threshold] restrictions so op-
erators could get what they needed.’’22 Ordinarily, Congressional appropriations are
restricted by their purpose, a time horizon, and the amount. Thus, the economic ra-
tionality of an individual spending decision is constrained by the political objectives
which defined the appropriation. For example, only items that cost under $250,000 may
be purchased with operations and maintenance funds even if a more economical item
(say, in net present value terms) is priced slightly above the threshold. With DERF, only
the grand total amount was constrained, which permitted the comptrollers within the
department to execute in a more economically rational fashion. The same comptroller
said, ‘‘Some new stuff made it to the field that never went thru [sic] the requirements
process. That would have been impossible under normal appropriation law and pro-
curement rules. My impression is that the upper levels of DOD management didn’t like
that much freedom in the field. It’s too messy and excludes the central authority from
the decision process. From an accounting standpoint DERF was a better way to do
business.’’23
Those in the field did, however, acknowledge other accounting difficulties. Recall that
the accounting categories for DERF did not align with Defense Department normal
appropriations or the major force program structure used for budgeting. The comp-
troller noted, ‘‘In Aviation Maintenance, for example, it would have been nearly im-
possible to separate out dollars for parts spent on contingency missions from dollars
spent on other missions. You would only have flying hour estimates. The view of Con-
gress was that they poured in money and DOD couldn’t show where they had spent the
money.’’24
22. Anonymous, 2003, Naval Special Warfare Command Official, Interview, July 24, 2003.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
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ADDING RESTRICTIONS TO DERF
The DOD and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Re-
sponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002 (PL 107-117) were enacted in
early January 2002 and appropriated an additional $3,395.6 million into DERF, direct-
ing the funds into six of the 10 spending categories. Of note is that these funds were
directly appropriated into DERF (the September appropriation was provided to the
president who later transferred it into DERF), so these funds are slightly more restricted
ex ante than were the initial funds. Also of note are several earmarks, including $500,000
for the White House Commission on the National Moment of Remembrance, a transfer
of $775 million to the Pentagon Reservation Maintenance Revolving Fund, and the
authority to obligate up to $100 million for payments to Pakistan and Jordan for lo-
gistical and military support. Wide transfer authority was provided but with the re-
quirements for quarterly reports from the Secretary of Defense specifying the project and
accounts to which funds were transferred. While it is quite common for such earmarks to
occur in the annual appropriations bill, these were the first earmarks attached specifically
to the emergency response fund. Table 2 displays these various pieces of legislation and
other congressional actions, noting when they occurred and the control instrumentation
used by Congress and its audit arm, the GAO, to influence DOD budget execution.
Emboldened by the flexible budgetary authority provided by the Congress, the ad-
ministration presented to Congress the FY 2003 budget including in it a request for $19.4
billion in DERF. Of that figure, $9.4 billion was identified to specific programs affected
by the war of terrorism, for example, the replacement of munitions, the cost to refurbish
equipment, and the cost to replenish supplies. ‘‘The remaining $10 billion ... is the pure
wartime contingency,’’ Defense Department Comptroller Dov Zakheim testified to the
Senate Armed Services Committee. ‘‘So it was a very conservative estimate that we
needed for planning purposes and, as the secretary of defense said, to signal to everybody
that we are committed to carry on.’’25 In essence, the administration requested for
the subsequent FY (eight months in advance of the start of the year) a $10 billion
contingency fund in an account that had few restrictions. This was considered a
contingency request in that Congress would appropriate the funds, but the president
would be required to notify Congress of the need for the funds before he could access
them. Congress historically had been reluctant to appropriate such funds because of
their undefined and tentative nature, preferring to fund such contingenciesFif they
occurFwith supplemental appropriations.
Including DERF in the annual budget was an unusual request. As noted earlier, the
Defense Department does not, as a matter of policy, budget for contingency operations.
Supplemental appropriations had been the traditional method of acquiring additional
resources and took the form of specific requests for specific items to address the
25. Dov S. Zakheim, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Read-
iness and Management Support, 6 March 2002.
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contingency. Reaching further in March 2002, on the heels of the FY2003 budget,
the president requested an additional FY 2002 supplemental appropriation for the
war on terrorism, assistance to New York City, homeland security, and other needs.
Part of this $27.1 billion request was $14 billion for DOD of which $11.3 billion was
requested in the form of DERF. By this time, Congress was not inclined to lightly
consider these requests.
In an attempt to gauge DOD ability to manage such funds, the appropriations com-
mittees used a common micromanagement tool asking the GAO to examine DOD’s
accounting for recent contingency operations. GAO noted that the accounting was gen-
erally good, but that there were instances of questionable costs being attributed to
contingency operations. The appropriations committees made this issue a highlight of
the spring hearings that were considering the FY 2002 supplemental and the FY 2003
regular appropriations.26
During homeland security hearings in May 2002, the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee raised the issues cited in the GAO reports and asked the secretary of defense,
How can you assure this committee that any supplemental appropriations provided in the Defense
Emergency Response Fund will be used only for the costs of the war, and not for unrelated or
frivolous items? I wonder what kind of strings we might be able to write into the appropriations
bills that will give to the elected representatives of the people in the legislative branch the where-
withal that they may be assured that appropriate accountability is being given to the expenditure
of the taxpayers’ money.27
Political realities, however, were less idealistic and more pragmatic. This bill was very
likely to pass since it was portrayed as primarily providing relief to New York City.
Unrelated items of congressional constituent interest became riders and the bill grew to
$28.9 billion, including $11.9 billion of DERF. Congress did attach strings: the DERF
authority was earmarked for transfer into several accounts, the bill contained military
construction funds for Army Corps of Engineers projects in seven different states, and
the bill added special interest items including rules on immigration, the international
criminal court, international AIDS programs, Pell student financial aid grants, Amtrak
support, and federal nutrition programs (American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of
2002). The administration received as much funding as they requested and most of the
flexible spending authorities. However, these new funds were, in effect, simply reim-
bursement for those appropriations that were used in the time between requesting the
supplemental and its enactment five months later.
26. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Need to Strengthen Guidance and Oversight of Con-
tingency Operations Cost, GAO-02-450 (Washington, DC, May 2002).
27. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee. Homeland Security. 107th Cong., 2nd session, 7 May
2002.
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CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION REQUESTS FOR
DELEGATED AUTHORITY
In the heat of the moment in September 2001, Congress provided broad budget exe-
cution authority to the executive branch, but in time was less willing to grant such
authority. The Bush administration, on the other hand, was becoming bolder in its
requests for delegation. At least through the first year since the terrorist attacks, Con-
gress was willing to provide the administration more than the quantity of funds re-
quested and most of the flexibility. But the trend showed increasing use of the tools of
micromanagement. Congressional resistance to further delegation was grounded in two
arguments: Defense Department accounting practices were unreliable and constitutional
separation of powers.
Evidence on accounting problems was abundant and in some cases legendary. The
Defense Department is one of three agencies still unable to achieve an unqualified Chief
Financial Officer’s Act-required audit opinion on their financial statements, and the best
estimate is that it will be several years before this is possible. This reflects on the federal
government at large: most of the material weaknesses preventing the federal government
from earning an unqualified audit opinion stem from poor accounting practices within
the Defense Department.28 DOD had longstanding problems accounting for contingency
operations: ‘‘We found that limited guidance and oversight combined with a lack of cost-
consciousness contributed to the questionable expenditure of contingency funds.’’29
More importantly, Congress was leery of the constitutional issue raised by the ad-
ministration’s requests. They were unwilling to let go of their constitutional authority
(Article I, Sections 8 and 9) to direct through the power of the purse what the DOD will
do, when they will do it, and to what level of effort. The administration countered by
offering an accounting of expenditures from the fund in lieu of restrictions on its use.
Congressional response was to cite that the Constitution not only assigns them the
responsibility to appropriate funds, but also requires a periodic accounting and re-
porting of expenditures. That offer, Congress retorted, was hollow since it already was a
requirement.
The deliberations over the $30 billion supplemental bill in the spring and summer of
2002 consumed a disproportionate amount of attention from the Congressional com-
mittees involved in budgeting, authorizing programs, and appropriating the funds for
them. In addition to the legislation that created the Department of Homeland Security,
the supplemental was one more distraction at a time when Congress was struggling with
the dilemma of the reversal of the nation’s financial outlook. A year earlier, projections
were commonplace that budget surpluses would exist for the foreseeable future, the
national debt would be managed, and alternative plans for ‘‘saving’’ Social Security were
28. General Accounting Office, Fiscal Year 2002 U.S. Government Financial Statements, GAO-03-572T
(Washington, DC, 8 April 2003).
29. GAO, ‘‘Oversight of Contingency Operations Cost.’’
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aired. The combination of the 2001 tax cuts and the economic downturn following the
terrorist attacks reversed that outlook. The Senate was incapable of passing a Budget
Resolution for FY 2003 for only the second time since the process began in 1976. In the
absence of a resolution, the authorizing and appropriating committee leaders became the
spending conscience for the Congress. It was the end of June before the chairman of the
Appropriations Committee established targets for the subcommittees to use in con-
structing the appropriations bills. Without the constraint of the rest of Congress, these
targets were 12 percent above FY 2002 spending levels.30
In July 2002, the president amended his FY 2003 budget request by deleting the
contingency clause on the request for $10 billion DERF. It was determined that the
contingency was a certainty and allocations were provided for personnel, operations and
maintenance, and procurement accounts. The administration also requested the flexi-
bility to move funds between these accounts. The appropriations committee placed the
$10 billion in the accounts approximately as described in the July budget amendment,
but did not grant the administration the requested transfer authority. While the admin-
istration intended the allocation to be loosely defined targets, they were appropriated as
firm figures.
The Bush administration took one more opportunity to request flexibility. The war on
terrorism reached the point where world leaders anticipated (and some opposed) a U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq. This would be expensive, the planned military operations were
unconventional, and the administration made a case for budget flexibility in the sup-
plemental budget request submitted less than a week after major fighting began in Iraq.
The March 25, 2003, memo read, in part,
This request reflects urgent and essential requirements. Much of the funding has been requested
with flexible authorities. This flexibility will ensure requirements can be immediately addressed as
they arise despite the unpredictable scope, duration and intensity of operations. I ask the Congress
to appropriate the funds as requested, and promptly send the bill to me for signature. I urge the
Congress to refrain from attaching items not directly related to the emergency at hand.31
The Defense Department portion of the budget request totaled $62.6 billion, of which
$59.9 billion was requested as DERF. The uses for the DERF were described in very
broad terms; amounts qualified with phrases like ‘‘up to’’ and ‘‘at least.’’ Also requested
was wide-sweeping transfer authority, including the retroactive reimbursement of ac-
counts tapped to fund the military buildup and the authority to support the military
operations of foreign nations. The requested transfer authority extended beyond the
supplemental dollars. The memo requested that the language in the FY 2003 Defense
30. Daniel J. Parks, ‘‘Midyear Spending Deal Likely in Early July; Democrats, Bush Harden Fiscal ’03
Lines,’’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 29 June 2002, 1730.
31. George W. Bush, Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. FY2003 Supplemental:
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 25 March 2003; available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amend
ments/supplemental_3_25_03.pdf: accessed 30 December 2003.
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Appropriations bill be revised to raise the transfer authority from $2 billion to ‘‘2.5
percent of the total amount appropriated.’’ This equates to approximately $9 billion. The
department further proposed separate accounting for the funds and quarterly reporting.
The request included $250 million for the Executive Office of the President Emergency
Response Fund for ‘‘unanticipated needs.’’ These funds would be available for transfer
to any federal agency ‘‘for immediate or emerging terrorism-related prevention require-
ments throughout the federal government.’’32
Given the scope of mobilization for the Iraqi phase of the war on terrorism, it was
common knowledge that the administration would need this supplemental funding.
Congress asked the GAO to conduct a review on the previous DERF appropriations.
GAO reported that OMB provided adequate guidance, but DOD provided no further
clarification and those charged with spending the DERF interpreted guidance in various
ways, diminishing the quality of accounting for costs. Further, GAO noted the differ-
ences between the 10 OMB accounting categories and DOD’s regular appropriation
structures. As DERF was transferred into other accounts, the funds were commingled,
further complicating the accounting. DOD required the use of contingency operations
accounting practices as articulated in the Financial Management Regulations, but they,
too, did not align with the OMB requirements. In short, DOD had difficulty reporting
accurately the use of prior DERF appropriations.33
There was a strong reaction in Congress to the Bush administration proposals. The
Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee published a strongly worded doc-
ument, ‘‘The Bush Administration and the Power of the Purse,’’ that stated the sup-
plemental request included ‘‘proposals to circumvent Congress’s constitutionally
mandated role’’ and ‘‘are a clear affront to Congress and the public’s responsibility to
oversee taxpayer dollars.’’34 In the Senate, Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV) took issue with the
flexibilities in the proposal as highlighted in this exchange in an appropriations com-
mittee hearing on March 27, 2003:
Sen. Byrd: ‘‘You request the authority to exempt these funds from congressional notification
procedures and from all laws that regulate how the United States may give to its friends. Those
laws are there for a reason.... Last year, the Defense Department requested a similar $10 billion
reserve fund for operations in Afghanistan. Congress disagreed and worked with you to specify
accounts for funding. Is there a specific reason why such an approach would not work today?’’
Sec. Rumsfeld: ‘‘Senator, because the Congress did not provide the $10 billion that we requested,
the Department of Defense had to borrow from other accounts all through October, all through
November, all through December, all through January, until we finally got $6.1 billion, thanks to
32. Ibid.
33. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget: Tracking of Emergency Response Funds for the War
on Terrorism GAO-03-346 (Washington, DC, April 2003).
34. Congress, House of Representatives, Appropriations Committee, The Bush Administration and the
Power of the Purse; available at: http://www.house.gov/appropriations_democrats/suppflexibility.htm: ac-
cessed 30 December 2003.
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this committee and the Congress, to pay back money that had already been spent. It’s just a
terrible way to operate.’’
Sen. Byrd: ‘‘Well, Mr. Secretary, I understand it may be a terrible way, but we’re talking about the
expenditure of the taxpayers’ money. . . . There are limitations, there will be limitations, there
ought to be limitations. Why this situation is so different, I can’t understand. This country has
fought several wars, and much more major than this war will probably be, insofar as length of time
for the war and its duration the costs and the loss of manpower, and so on. So I see no reasonFlet
me say againFfor Congress to extend these flexibilities.’’35
A few days later on the Senate floor, Senator Byrd spoke on the issue in an impas-
sioned speech:
For decades, Presidential administrations have sought to wrap their fingers around the purse
strings, push away the Congress, and ignore the Constitution. . . . It does not matter what ad-
ministration it is. It does not matter the political party of the President. What matters is nothing
more than raw power. . . . Congress has it. The executive branch wants it.
The cry went out: ‘‘Give us flexibility. . . . But it was not really flexibility that the administration
wanted; it was power, power, power over the purse, power over the Congress. Wisely, the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees limited this power grab in this supplemental request.’’36
Further, there was significant skepticism in the media regarding the appropriateness
of the Iraq phase of the war on terrorism and the manner in which it was being con-
ducted. This criticism of the administration resonated with some members of Congress
and in some constituent communities.
Congress moved very quickly on the supplemental appropriation bill. Hearings were
completed by April 7 and a conference committee convened on April 8. The committee
reported out on April 12 and both houses of Congress passed the bill the same day. The
president signed the supplemental appropriation a few days later. While the Defense
Department received the $62.6 billion it requested, it did not contain the desired flex-
ibility. Said the undersecretary of defense (comptroller), ‘‘We didn’t get everything we
wanted. We asked for a lot more in the way of flexibility, in the region of $59 billion. If
you parse what the actual language of the bill is and report language and so on, you see
that the flexibility is closer to between 10 1/2 and 11 billion.’’37
What DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim was referring to was the creation of the Iraqi
Freedom Fund (IFF). Rather than appropriate $59 billion into DERF as the admin-
istration requested, Congress instead established the Iraqi Freedom Fund with $15.7
billion. Of that amount, over $5 billion was earmarked for various uses, arriving at the
35. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, Fiscal Year 2003 Supplemental Budget Request. 108th
Cong., 1st session, 27 March 2003.
36. Congressional Record. 2003. 108th Cong., 1st session, 149 Cong. Rec. S 5397, Vol. 149, pt. 59.
37. Dov S. Zakheim, Press Briefing Transcript (April 16, 2003); available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2003/tr20030416-0113.html: accessed 19 June 2004.
Public Budgeting & Finance / Winter 200516
‘‘between 10 1/2 and 11 billion’’ figure cited by Zakheim. Congress further stipulated,
‘‘As of October 31, 2003, all balances of fund remaining in the ‘Defense Emergency
Response Fund’ shall be transferred to, and merged with, the ‘Iraqi Freedom Fund.’’’ In
short, at the end of October, DERF would cease to exist as a separate account for new
spending. With respect to other flexibilities sought, Congress denied the request for a
Presidential Emergency Response Fund and compromised on the issue of expanded
transfer authority.
Although all remaining balances in DERF were transferred to the Iraqi Freedom
Fund in the fall of 2003, that did not end congressional scrutiny. As recently as May
2004, congressional appropriators were questioning the use of DERF funds to prepare
for the invasion of Iraq. Bob Woodward alleged such spending occurred in his book,
‘‘Plan of Attack’’, which raised concerns in Congress. Media interest of defense mis-
management is cited as an incentive for congressional oversight.38 Scrutiny and oversight
of DOD spending on the war on terrorism continued through the deliberations of the FY
2005 ‘‘bridge’’ appropriation and the spring 2005 supplemental.
DISCUSSION
This research found that, first, Congress delegated budget authority to DOD under crisis
conditions, where it is perceived that such flexibility is warranted and must be provided
expeditiously to assist the president in responding to a national security emergency.
There was little debate in Congress on whether funds should be appropriated for defense;
nearly all members were in agreement. Thus, in the first supplemental appropriation after
9–11, Congress delegated authority to DOD because of the exigency of the situation,
similar to the practice of providing minimally constrained emergency appropriations in
response to natural disasters.39
Second, Congress initially delegated considerable authority but then serially withdrew
much of this delegation over time for DERF and other defense supplemental appro-
priations. One finds Congress gradually returning to traditional methods of oversight:
hearings and testimony, reporting requirements, reprogramming and transfer restric-
tions, earmarked funds, reviews and investigations by legislative entities, and the fencing
of funds pending compliance with provisions.
Finally, this case is quite instructive about the evolution of the budgetary relationship
between Congress and DOD. Presidential administrations have sought increased dele-
gation of authority and control over budget execution over the past four decades, par-
ticularly as congressional oversight of the budget increased. Immediately after the
September 2001 terrorist attacks when the scope and nature of the U.S. response
38. Lindsay; Jones and Bixler.
39. McCaffery and Godek.
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was unclear, Congress was fairly comfortable with Bush administration requests for
increased budget execution autonomy. As Congress initially accommodated the request,
the Bush administration was emboldened to ask for increasingly more autonomy. Con-
gress, in turn, expressed increased concern over the shift of constitutional authority and
became more dubious of the ‘‘you can trust us’’ attitude of the Bush administration and
DOD. Reasons included doubt about U.S. antiterrorism initiatives, especially the war in
Iraq, and longstanding budget, management, and accounting problems within DOD. As
Congress tightened control, the administration was compelled to ask for even greater
flexibility, culminating in the March 2003 supplemental request for tens of billions of
relatively unfettered authority. Congress reacted strongly and not just refused to provide
the flexibility sought; in doing so, it all but eliminated the delegated authority previously
authorized. Why? Incentives changed.
Numerous incentives exist for Congress to attempt to actively influence Defense
Department policy, budgets and internal management practices, and many means exist
to carry out its oversight and policy direction. In the case of the DERF, Congress did not
exercise most of these tools at first because sufficient incentive did not exist;
in fact disincentives to micromanage were present. The incentive for Congress to sup-
port the president’s request was greater than the incentive to intrusively manage DOD
budget execution. In fact, the incentive for members was to appear to be as patriotic or
more so than political opponents, partially explaining why, when the president requested
a $20 billion supplemental appropriation, Congress quickly appropriated $40 billion.
Combating terrorism is not specific to any congressional district or set of constituents. In
the crisis climate immediately after 9/11, partisan politics were minimized, but only
temporarily. At that point, attempts to manipulate defense and national security ap-
propriations for parochial interests would have been politically inappropriate. It is
apparent that Congress did not, in fact, delegate much budget authority to the Defense
Department as a deliberate choice. Rather, Congress did not perceive an advantage in
denying such authority. Congress, at first, had political reasons to restrain itself. How-
ever, once the political environment changed and with it the shift in the incentive struc-
ture, Congress shifted from delegation to activism, returning to familiar patterns of
behavior.
CONCLUSION
We may anticipate that some critics of our study and findings might observe, in effect,
‘‘so what else is new?’’ What our research contributes to the literature is a detailed
empirical study of an exceptional case with regard to congressional control of defense
budgeting, a circumstance where Congress denied itself the opportunity to micromanage
and delegated significant budget execution authority to DOD. The conventional wisdom
relative to Congress is, essentially, that it is not capable of relaxing such control. We
demonstrate that such is not always the case. With DERF, as with the process for Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC), under some circumstances Congress is willing to
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delegate a considerable degree of control.40 However, when conditions change the del-
egation may be withdrawn. This has not happened with BRAC, but it did with the
DERF.
The purpose of this study was not to criticize either Congress or the DOD relative to
the degree of delegation of management and budget authority provided to DOD. Rather,
our intent was to explore the circumstances under which Congress is more or less likely
to delegate budget execution authority. The case study of DERF provides insights into
the variables that influence the degree and types of delegation Congress will support. We
have demonstrated that under conditions where there is a perception of high uncertainty
and significant imminent threat to U.S. national security, Congress responds to DOD
requests for increased delegation. Once uncertainty or immediacy is reduced, and after
the foreign policy objectives of the executive branch become clearFand where these
objectives and the means for achieving them become more controversialFCongress is
far less likely to delegate authority to the executive branch and to the DOD.
NOTE
Portions of the article are drawn from ‘‘The Defense Emergency Response Fund: A Case
Study of Delegation of Budget Authority by Congress to the Department of Defense’’
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Budgeting and Financial Man-
agement of the American Society of Public Administration, Chicago, IL, 6–9 October
2004. The authors would like to thank Phil Joyce, Fred Thompson, and Denise Fantone
for their helpful suggestions at that forum, the anonymous reviewers at PB&F, and their
colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School.
40. Fred Thompson, ‘‘Why the American Military Base Structure Can’t Be Reduced,’’ Public Admin-
istration Review 48, no. 1 (1988): 577–567.
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